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Medical litigation, in recent years, has been characterized by im-
pressively large recoveries in several highly publicized medical mal-
practice suits1 and an apparent expansion in the scope of liability
applicable to health care providers.2 In Helling v. Carey,3 for ex-
ample, the Washington Supreme Court disregarded unanimous expert
medical testimony and a jury verdict in favor of the defendant phy-
sicians to hold two ophthalmologists negligent as a matter of law for
failure to give the plaintiff a pressure test designed to detect glau-
coma. The test was not normally given to patients like the plaintiff
who were under 40 years of age, because of the very low incidence
of glaucoma within that class. Failure to detect the disease at an early
stage resulted in severe damage to her visual field for which the court
ordered compensation.
From the patient's point of view, larger and more accessible re-
coveries might seem a highly beneficial development; the malprac-
tice liability system is meant to police the quality of care that patients
receive and to compensate the victim when care is negligent. 4 But on
a broader view the trend is not an unmixed blessing. Malpractice
litigation is typically lengthy, complex, and expensive, even for a suc-
cessful plaintiff.5 The recent rash of suits has driven physicians' costs
for malpractice insurance rapidly higher. 6 In some parts of the country
1. See, e.g., TIME, Mar. 24, 1975, at 62 (recoveries of $4,025,000; $300,000; and$1,000,000); NEWSWEEK, Feb. 10, 1975, at 41; New Haven Reg., Feb. 15, 1975, at 35, col.
6. The concern over possibly deficient medical care is not new. See, e.g., 2 Kings 5:1-19,
discussed in Gordis, An Early Commentary on Medical Care, 292 NEW ENG. J. MED. 44
(1975).
2. See, e.g., CAL. ASSEMBLY SELEcT CoMMf. ON MEDICAL MALPRAcTIcE, PRELIMINARY RE-
PORT 27-32 (1974) [hereinafter cited as PRELIMINARY REPORT].
3. 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974), rev'g 8 Wash. App. 1005 (1972) (copy of middle
level opinion on file with the Yale Law Journal).
4. See, e.g., D. HARNEY, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 92 (1973).
5. Malpractice litigation costs the nation an estimated two billion dollars yearly in
legal fees. Welch, PSRO's-Pros and Cons, 290 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1319, 1321 (1974). In-
deed, Gerald Rosenthal, Director of Health Services Research, HEW, has stated that
malpractice litigation may now be costing five to six billion dollars. Telephone Interview
with G. Rosenthal, Jan. 29, 1975 (notes on file with the Yale Law Journal). Leading
plaintiff's attorneys have asserted that only one in ten possible claims against health care
providers brought to the lawyer's office will result in legal action. Rubsamen, No-Fault
Liability for Adverse Medical Results-Is It a Reasonable Alternative to the Present Tort
System?, AL. MED.., July 1972, at 78, 79. There is evidence that plaintiffs with claims
under $20,000 in value cannot find attorneys willing to pursue their case. Id. at 87.
6. The volume of malpractice litigation against health care providers has increased
enormously. See Project, The Medical Malpractice Threat: A Study of Defensive Medicine,1971 DUKE . 9 940 n.4. This has prompted widespread public c ncern. See, e.g., Suing
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insurers are threatening to withdraw coverage altogether; 7 any such
region is likely to have difficulty attracting new physicians." Perhaps
more important, the threat of malpractice suits is thought by some to
induce "defensive medicine"-a pejorative label for unnecessary treat-
ment or testing given solely to avoid the possibility of a lawsuitY All
this may mean increasing costs for the consumers of medical care, costs
which possibly should be avoided.
Because the negligence liability system in the medical care field
is haphazard and expensive, numerous suggestions for change have
appeared. One group of proposals urges implementation of strict lia-
bility,10 a liability system which in some settings promises a substan-
the Doctor, TIME, July 15, 1974, at 78; PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 2; Malpractice
Costs Driving Doctors Off, N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1974, at 12, col. 3.
The dramatic rise in claims filed against providers has been accompanied by large
increases in premiums paid for malpractice insurance. For example, California has wit-
nessed a 500 percent increase in recent years. PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 2, at 37.
Rate increases in Connecticut ranged from 36 percent to 167 percent in the past year.
Letter from M. David Deren to Physician Members in the CSMS-Aetna Professional
Liability Program, undated (copy on file with the Yale Law Journal). Michigan is also
experiencing difficulties with insurance availability. See, e.g., Grand Rapids Press, Nov.
28, 1974, at 1, col. 5.
Signs of the malaise in malpractice insurance market include the fact that "[hlospital
associations in six Midwestern states are studying the possibility of teaming with Lloyds
of London in a medical malpractice insurance pool." Des Moines Reg., Jan. 1, 1975, at 3,
col. 6. This move was prompted by the cancellation of policies by a California insurer.
The hospital associations would create a pool to pay judgments up to S300,000 and
Lloyds of London would cover judgments in excess of this amount. With respect to New
York, see Hospital Insurer Raising Rate 189%, N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 1975, at 39, col. 1.
Asserting that doctors have become virtually uninsurable, St. Paul Fire and Marine
Insurance Co. has decided to cease offering traditional insurance coverage to 48,000
doctors in 47 states. The company will no longer attempt to predict in advance claims
based on medical services rendered when the policy is in effect. Rather, the company will
adopt a "pay as you go" type of coverage which will cover claims reported during the
year the policy is in effect. N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1975, at 35, col. 1. See Elser, "Claims
Made"-Miracle Drug for Malpractice Insurance Market?, 16 FOR THE DEFENSE 25 (1975).
7. See Wall St. J., Dec. 30, 1974, at 10, col. 4; N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1975, § 5, at 6, col. 2
(New York experience); PARADE, Feb. 16, 1975, at 8. The Secretary of Health, Education
and Welfare, Caspar Weinberger, has indicated that physicians in seven states are in
danger of losing their malpractice coverage. Wall St. J., supra. The crisis in Maryland is
detailed in Am. Med. News, Jan. 6, 1975, at 9, col. 1.
8. There is evidence that physicians in New York are already finding that less than
full time practice is not feasible because of malpractice insurance costs. See N.Y. Times,
Jan. 13, 1975, at 29, col. 2; cf. Malpractice Costs Driving Doctors Off, supra note 6.
9. See, e.g., HEW SEC'Y'S COMM'N ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, REPORT 14-15 (1973);
King, Book Review, 1974 DUKE L.J. 1000, 1001.
10. See Ehrenzweig, Compulsory "Hospital-Accident" Insurance: A Needed First Step
Toward the Displacement of Liability for "Medical Malpractice," 31 U. CI. L. REV. 279
(1964); Franklin, Tort Liability for Hepatitis: An Analysis and a Proposal, 24 STAN. L.
REv. 439 (1972); Havighurst & Tancredi, "Medical Adversity Insurance"-A No-Fault Ap-
proach to Medical Malpractice and Quality Assurance, 51 HEALTH & Socy 125 (1973);
Keeton, Compensation for Medical Accidents, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 590, 616 (1973) (rejects
strict liability); O'Connell, Expanding No-Fault Beyond Auto Insurance: Some Proposals,
59 VA. L. REv. 749 (1973); O'Connell, Extending the "No-Fault" Idea, THE PUBLIC INTEREST,
Summer 1974, at 112; O'Connell, It's Time for No Fault of All Kinds of Injuries, 60
A.B.A.J. 1070 (1974); O'Connell, Elective No-Fault Insurance for Many Kinds of Accidents:
A Proposal and an "Economic Analysis," 42 TENN. L. REV. 145, 146-47 (1974); Symposium,
The Patient Injured by Medical Care: Whose Responsibility?, THE NEW PHYSICIAN, Nov.
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tial savings in litigation costs." In fact, three of the justices who con-
curred in Helling advocated a limited implementation of strict lia-
bility in medical maloccurrence cases.' 2 Justice Tobriner of the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court offered similar advice in 1968.13 A second sug-
gested alternative involves increased reliance on collective decision-
making with respect to what medical procedures are desirable. Under
some versions of the second approach, health care providers would
receive immunity from civil liability if they provided care in ac-
cordance with collectively determined standards.' 4
One important function of any tort liability system is to promote
economic efficiency, to deter conduct which produces societal costs
greater than its benefits.' 5 Different systems may be judged by how
1974, at 62, 64; Comment, Continuing the Common Law Response to the New Industrial
State: The Extension of Enterprise Liability to Consumer Services, 22 U.C.L.A.L. REV.
401, 427-30 (1974); A. HOLDER, MEDICAL MALPRAcTIcE LAW 431-34 (1975); J. O'CONNELL,
ENDING INSULT TO INJURY (1975); N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1975, at 33, col. 1.
Cases rejecting strict liability include Carmichael v. Reitz, 17 Cal. App. 3d 958, 95 Cal.
Rptr. 381 (1971) (drug reaction); Silverhart v. Mount Zion Hosp., 20 Cal. App. 3d 1022, 98
Cal. Rptr. 187 (1971) (broken surgical needle); Magner v. Beth Israel Hosp., 120 N.J.
Super. 529, 295 A.2d 363 (1972) (plastic surgery); Magrine v. Krasnica, 94 N.J. Super. 228,
227 A.2d 539 (Co. Ct. 1967), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Magrine v. Spector, 100 N.J. Super.
223, 225-41, 241 A.2d 637, 638-47 (1968) (dissent advocated strict liability), afj'd per curiam,
53 N.J. 259, 250 A.2d 129 (1969).
The possibility of strict liability for medical accidents has been noted in PRELIMINARY
REPORT, supra note 2, at 27, 60. Strict liability was disapproved in HEW SEc'Y's COsM'N
ON MEmCAL MALPEAcTIcE, REPORT 30 (1973). A report to the Commission, however, out-
lined a strict liability system resembling Workmen's Compensation. See Roth & Rosenthal,
Non Fault Based Medical Injury Compensation Systems, in APPENDIX To REPORT 450
(HEW Sec'y's Comm'n on Medical Malpractice ed. 1973). Strict liability, sometimes called
no-fault liability, does not mean liability without causation; it simply means that the
plaintiff need not show that the defendant was negligent. Strict liability may be contrasted
with absolute liability, the latter not requiring any causative link. See Passwaters v.
General Motors Corp., 454 F.2d 1270, 1277 n.7 (8th Cir. 1972).
11. See Comment, supra note 10, at 444-46.
12. The Helling concurrence opted for strict liability when (i) the harm was caused by
failure to give a simple, harmless procedure; (ii) the activity involved can be defined
with sufficient precision to serve as an accounting unit to which to allocate costs; (iii) the
doctors had more knowledge than the patient; and (iv) the existing medical standard
afforded inadequate protection. Helling v. Carey, 83 Wash. 2d 514, 521-22, 519 P.2d 981,
984-85 (1974).
13. Clark v. Gibbons, 66 Cal. 2d 399, 414, 426 P.2d 525, 535, 58 Cal. Rptr. 125, 135
(1967) (Tobriner, J., urged strict liability for unexplained medical maloccurrences even
when it was not shown that the health care providers were negligent).
14. See pp. 1161-63 infra.
15. See Calabresi, Optimal Deterrence and Accidents: To Fleming James, Jr., 84 YALE
L.J. 656 (1975). As Professor Calabresi points out, other goals are also important. Id. at
656 n.1.
For a discussion of the theoretical benchmark, a perfect market which achieves "Pareto
optimality," see P. SAMUEtsoN, ECONOMIcs 632 (9th ed. 1973). Because the perfectly com-
petitive market leads to efficient allocation of resources, many economists have argued
that resource allocation should be left to the market. Public policy would then be con-
fined to the problem of achieving the socially optimal distribution of income by a sys-
tem of taxes and subsidies. This approach is summarized in Arrow, Uncertainty and the
Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. EcoN. REV. 941, 942-43 (1963). Since questions
involving allocation of resources are roughly severable from questions of income distribu-
tion, this Note will concentrate on allocation, assuming that methods of taxation and
subsidies are available to approach socially optimal income redistributions.
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well they reduce the sum of three separate costs: the costs of the mal-
occurrences themselves-primarily the harm to patients; the costs of
detection and treatment-the costs of avoidance; and the costs of ad-
ministering the system-most significantly, lawyer fees and court costs.',
This Note will measure the various malpractice liability systems by
this standard. That is, it will concentrate on using the liability system
to promote an economically efficient allocation of resources-this not
because of any easy assumption that the costs and benefits which make
up the health care calculus are readily monetizable. 17 Rather, attention
to the concerns of economic efficiency will serve as a focus for law-
makers and health care providers who are required to make decisions
about optimal amounts of medical services. Determination of the op-
timal amount of care is a difficult task, largely due to fundamental
problems in the medical care market. These problems, centered on
uncertainty and lack of information, 8 bedevil the operation of any
system of liability for maloccurrences resulting from medical care.
The Note begins with an examination of the information problem
in the medical care market.
I. Market Failure in the Medical Care Industry:
Uncertainty and Information
A basic tenet of modern economics is that under certain general
conditions the market mechanism will allocate resources efficiently.' 9
Professor Kenneth Arrow has argued that the market for medical care
fails to satisfy these competitive preconditions, and thus fails to func-
tion efficiently, because of the prevalence of uncertainty and the im-
portance of information in the market. 20
16. See G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 26-28 (1970).
17. See Botta v. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82, 138 A.2d 713 (1958). For a recent discussion on
valuation of pain and suffering, see Peck, Compensation for Pain: A Reappraisal in Light
of New Medical Evidence, 72 MICH. L. REV. 1355 (1974). For a theoretical discussion, see
Mishan, Evaluation of Life and Limb: A Theoretical Approach, 79 J. POL. ECON. 687
(1971).
18. Arrow, supra note 15, at 947; cf. Arrow, Limited Knowledge and Economic Analysis,
64 AM. ECON. REv. 1, 8 (1974). The information with which this Note is most concerned
is that "needed for decisionmaking by organizations and individuals who plan, finance,
administer, provide, monitor and evaluate health services." Murnaghan, Health-Services
Information Systems in the United States Today, 290 NEiw EN.. J. MED. 603 (1974) (surveys
current systems for the provision to decisionmakers of information on health care); cf.
Anderson, PSRO as Educational Process, 290 NEw ENG. J. M.D. 1322 (1974).
19. Arrow, supra note 15, at 942-43. This section is drawn from Professor Arrow's
analysis.
20. Id. at 947. The major competitive preconditions include: "the existence of com-
petitive equilibrium, the marketability of all goods and services relevant to costs and
utilities, and nonincreasing returns. The first two ... insure that competitive equilibrium
is necessarily optimal; the third insures that every optimal state is the competitive equili-
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Unlike most of those commodities which constitute a significant
part of the consumer's budget, medical care is demanded unpredict-
ably and irregularly.21 Neither the incidence of illness nor the costs
of recovery from illness (including loss of earning power) can be known
in advance. The likelihood that the patient will have information
about the "product" and the "producer" is therefore low. This prob-
lem is compounded by the nature of the product-medical care-itself;
it too consists largely of information: a diagnosis, a recommended
treatment, and a prognosis.22 Moreover, the product provided by the
physician is itself of highly uncertain value; no matter how skillful
the physician, it is hard to know whether the diagnosis is correct and
whether the treatment will be effective.2 3 Information thus plays a
double role in the medical care industry: it is both part of the com-
modity bought and the means of mitigating the uncertainty surround-
ing the purchase. The patient cannot value what he is buying; "if,
indeed, he knew enough to measure the value of information, he
would know the information itself."24 The market cannot efficiently
allocate commodities which buyers cannot efficiently price.
According to Arrow, the imperfect marketability of information
helps to explain the institutional characteristics of the medical care
industry.2 5 For example, a relationship of trust has developed under
brium corresponding to some distribution of income." Id. at 944. The precondition not
fulfilled is the existence of markets for all goods and services, particularly insurance. See
note 25 infra.
21. Id. at 948-49.
22. Id. at 946.
23. See Thomas, Guessing and Knowing: Reflections on the Science and Technology of
Medicine, SATURDAY REV.-SCL, Sept. 23, 1972, at 52, 54 (remarks by Dean of Yale Med.
School); Dykes, Uncritical Thinking in Medicine-The Confusion Between Hypothesis and
Knowledge, 227 J.A.M.A. 1275, 228 id. 708 (1974).
"The way a doctor decides on a plan of management for a particular situation is to
review all previous clinical experience, to select those patients whose clinical situation
closely resembled the one now at hand, to recall the treatments and outcomes in the
'resemblance group,' to choose the treatment that gave the most successful results, and to
attempt to reproduce that success in the current patient.... [T]he conventional activities
of clinical work... can quite properly be regarded as experiments." Feinstein, Clinical
Biostatistics-XX VI. Medical Ethics and the Architecture of Clinical Research, 15 CuN.
PHARNIACOL. 8- THERAPEUTICS 316, 318 (1974); cf. A. FEINSTEIN, CLINICAL JUDGMENT 21-22
(1967). See generally Francois v. Mokrohisky, No. 426 (Wis., Mar. 6, 1975) (slip opinion at
5) ('physicians too often have attempted to encourage the aurae of an infallibility they
do not possess. Theirs is not an exact science and even the very best of them can be
wrong in diagnosis or procedure.").
24. Arrow, supra note 15, at 946.
25. Id. at 947. A second factor ProfeSsor Arrow lists is nonmarketability of risk bearing.
Arrow argues that "a great many risks are not covered" in the medical care industry, and
"the markets for the services of risk coverage are poorly developed or nonexistent." Id. at
945. "By the absence of marketability for an action which is identifiable, technologically
possible, and capable of influencing some individual's welfare, for better or worse, is meant
here the failure of the existing market to provide a means whereby the services can be
both offered and demanded upon payment of a price. Nonmarketability may be due to
intrinsic technological characteristics of the product which prevent a suitable price from
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which the physician is expected to act for the patient's welfare, not
as a profit-maximizer supplying the product solely for his own self-
interest.26 Arrow argues further that social institutions, most promi-
nent among them the government, will intervene in situations of mar-
ket failure to attempt to achieve an efficient allocation by nonmarket
means.2 7 One means of intervention is the medical malpractice lia-
bility system. 28
I. Negligence and Medical Malpractice
The standard of care for health care providers has traditionally
been based on a variant of negligence theory. Negligence, or fault,
demands that a defendant's conduct conform to the conduct of the
"reasonable man"; if it does not, the defendant must pay damages. "'
Judge Learned Hand gave content to this standard in his famous
calculus for negligence announced in Conway v. O'Brien:30
The degree of care demanded of a person by an occasion is the
resultant of three factors: the likelihood that his conduct will in-
jure others, taken with the seriousness of the injury if it happens
and balanced against the interest which he must sacrifice to avoid
the risk. All these are practically not susceptible of any quantita-
tive estimate, and the second two are generally not so, even the-
oretically. For this reason a solution always involves some pref-
erence, or choice between incommensurables, and it is consigned
to a jury because their decision is thought most likely to accord
with commonly accepted standards, real or fancied. 31
A person is liable under a fault system, then, if the cost of the harm
discounted by its probability is greater than that person's cost to pre-
vent the harm.32 Assuming perfect knowledge,33 the Hand calculus
will yield an efficient allocation of resources; total costs-the sum
being enforced, as in the case of communicable diseases, or it may be due to social or
historical controls, such as those prohibiting an individual from selling himself into
slavery." Id.
26. Arrow, Social Responsibility and Economic Efficiency, 21 PUBLIC POLICY 303, 313-
17 (1973).
27. See note 18 supra.
28. It is a familiar notion that the legal system may act as a surrogate for the market
where the market itself fails. See M. FRIEDMAN, Occupational Licensure, in CAPITALISM &
FREEDOM 157 (1962); cf. Arrow, supra note 26, at 310-13.
29. W. PROSSER, THE HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 149-66 (4th ed. 1972).
30. 111 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1940), rev'd on other grounds, 312 U.S. 492 (1941).
31. 111 F.2d at 612.
32. See Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J.
1055, 1057 (1972). A particular avoidance cost might mitigate several injuries. Therefore,
the actual Hand calculus is somewhat more complex.
33. See G. CALABRESI, supra note 16, at 91.
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of accident costs and accident prevention costs-will be minimized.3 4
A further qualification is required. If there are two parties involved
in a transaction which entails various probabilities of maloccurrences,
it is possible that each party's cost to avoid a maloccurrence is less
than the cost of the maloccurrence discounted by its probability. The
Hand negligence calculus, as previously defined, does not specify on
which of these parties liability should fall.35 If one assumes, however,
that the Hand formulation was designed to allocate blameworthiness
on the basis of achieving an efficient allocation of resources,36 the
dilemma is solved. The party who can avoid the accident at the lesser
cost should be held liable. Thus, a plaintiff who is contributorily
negligent should not recover against a negligent defendant if the
plaintiff could have avoided the maloccurrence at less expense than
the defendant. However, a contributorily negligent plaintiff should
recover if the negligent defendant could have more cheaply avoided
the accident.31 The Hand test, modified for contributory negligence,
would optimize allocation of resources, assuming no transaction costs.
Under this system of fault, the victim bears the costs of all accidents
not worth avoiding. 38
Some form of the Hand test thus could be applied to determine
liability in cases involving medical maloccurrences. Theoretically, ad-
judication of liability under the test would provide health care pro-
viders with useful information, identifying those procedures for which
costs exceed benefits. A functioning Hand test would in addition pro-
tect patients against the failure of their physicians to provide all health
care for which benefits exceed costs.
The negligence test, however, is often modified when applied to
34. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 69-70 (1972); Calabresi & Hirschoff,
supra note 32, at 1057; Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL SrUo. 29, 32-33 (1972).
35. See R. POSNER, supra note 34, at 70-71.
36. See id. at 69-70.
37. Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 32, at 1058.
38. Id. at 1059. Application of the Hand calculus to Helling v. Carey, see p. 1141 supra,
offers an instructive example of how the negligence test works. The likelihood of glau-
coma if the pressure test was not given was established at trial as approximately 1 in
25,000. The cost of the injury was deprivation of large portions of one's visual field for
the remainder of one's life. And the cost of avoiding the injury was the cost of administer-
ing the pressure test. Suppose the cost of the pressure test is SI0, and the cost of glau-
coma is $200,000. Then the discounted cost of glaucoma-the cost of the risk-is $8. (1 in
25,000 = .00004 or .004 percent; .00004 X 5200,000 = 58.) Under those circumstances,
the Hand test implies that ophthalmologists would not be negligent in failing to give the
pressure test.
Helling noted that the pressure test was simple. This suggests that the judges placed a
low value on the cost of avoiding glaucoma. However, the judges apparently did not
consider the aggregate cost of giving the test to 25,000 individuals to discover one victim
of glaucoma, or else the judges simply made no effort to discount the cost of glaucoma
by its likelihood of occurrence. Thus, it is not clear' that the defendant ophthalmologists,
or their profession, were negligent under the standard propounded by Judge Hand.
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health care providers by some variant of the defense of customary
conduct. Physicians traditionally have been liable only if their conduct
failed to conform to the standard of care observed by comparable
practitioners in the medical professions.39 Lawmakers should not as-
sume that the defense of custom is automatically related to the pro-
motion of optimal health care. Customary conduct may be the result
of careful analysis, but it may also "arise from the kind of inadver-
tence, carelessness, indifference, cost-paring and comer-cutting that
normally is associated with negligence." 40 A group setting its own
standard may lack incentive to make progress in the direction of
safety,41 since cases would be infrequent which hold one liable for
not doing something none have done before.42 The customary conduct
defense thus gives the medical profession special protection from
liability for outcomes which might otherwise be considered negligent
results. This protection means that injured plaintiffs cannot receive
compensation from their injurer for all forms of negligence; where
the defense of custom is recognized, providers are not liable for cus-
tomary negligence.43 The custom defense consequently protects phy-
sicians from liability to which they would be subject under an ideal
39. In the past, the standard of care required of a physician was that of comparable
physicians in the same, or similar communities. Ferrell v. Ellis, 129 Iowa 614, 615, 105
NAV. 993 (1906); Alexander v. Alton Ochsner Med. Foundation, 276 So. 2d 794, 799 (La.
App. 1973); Brock v. Gunter, 292 So. 2d 328, 330-31 (La. App. 1974); Raitt v. Johns Hop-
kins Hosp., 322 A.2d 548, 551 (Md. Spec. App. 1974); Small v. Howard, 128 Mass. 131, 132
(1880); Hansen v. Pock, 57 Mont. 51, 58-59, 187 P. 282, 284 (1920); some states now dis-
regard the practice in a local community, preferring to apply a wider standard of care.
Sinz v. Owens, 33 Cal. 2d 749, 754, 205 P.2d 3, 5-6 (1949); Gist v. French, 136 Cal. App. 2d
247, 269-71, 288 P.2d 1003, 1017-18 (1955); Pederson v. Dumouchel, 72 Wash. 2d 73, 79,
431 P.2d 973, 978 (1967); A. HOLDER, supra note 10, at 53-55. This is especially true as
regards specialists. E.g., McGulpin v. Bessmer, 241 Iowa 1119, 1129-32, 43 N.W.2d 121,,
126 (1950); Brune v. Belinkoff, 354 Mass. 102, 235 N.E.2d 793 (1968); A. HOLDER, supra
note 10, at 55-57.
The strict locality rule proved an unsatisfactory guide for determining the appro-
priateness of a provider's conduct for two reasons. First, community professionals were
reluctant to testify about the local standard of care. Second, the possibility remained that
a small group of providers could establish an unsatisfactory local standard of care through
laxity or carelessness. Pederson v. Dumouchel, 72 Wash. 2d 73, 77-78, 431 P.2d 973, 977(1967). The plaintiff has usually been required to elicit expert testimony establishing the
applicable standard of care. See Raitt v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 322 A.2d 548, 550-51 (Md.
Spec. App. 1974); Francois v. Mokrohisky, No. 426 (Wis., Mar. 6, 1975).
Both the requirement of expert testimony and the necessity to establish the applicable
professional standard of care are being abandoned by some courts with respect to in-
formed consent. See, e.g., Miller v. Kennedy, 522 P.2d 852, 859 (Wash. App. 1974); Holland
v. Sisters of St. Joseph of Peace, 522 P.2d 208 (Ore. 1974); Holt v. Nelson, 523 P.2d 211,
215 n.1 (Wash. App. 1974); Note, Informed Consent and the Dying Patient, 83 YALE L.J.
1632, 1639 n.44 (1974) (collects cases).
40. W. PROSSR, supra note 29, § 33, at 167.
41. See Pederson v. Dumouchel, 72 Wash. 2d 73, 78, 431 P.2d 973, 977 (1967); Posner,
supra note 34, at 39; R. PosNra, supra note 34, at 71-72.
42. See V. PROSSER, supra note 29, § 33, at 167.
43. See Pederson v. Dumouchel, 72 Wash. 2d 73, 78, 431 P.2d 973, 977 (1967); cf. Hiatt
v. Groce, 523 P.2d 320 (Kan. 1974).
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Learned Hand test. In recent years a few courts, including the Wash-
ington Supreme Court in Helling, have pierced the custom defense,44
making their own assessments of relative costs and benefits for a given
procedure. This development is generally a desirable one, offering a
means of policing against customary negligence.
Application of the Hand test in the context of medical maloccur-
rences, however, may be an ideal impossible to attain. The uncertainty
of the medical care market means that the jury's role of comparing
incommensurables is even more difficult in medical malpractice cases
than in most other tort lawsuits. The custom defense therefore may
represent less distortion, on the whole, of the Hand calculus than
the present system of jury discretion as to damages. 45 An important
reason for the retention of the custom defense has been the fear that
juries might abuse their power by too frequently compensating the
injured party,40 awarding damages even when the cost of avoiding
the maloccurrence is greater than the discounted cost of the maloc-
currence. A systematic bias of juries in this direction could result in
a misallocation of resources, one which might be greater than the mis-
allocation resulting from the custom defense. This misallocation would
44. Some courts have qualified the professional standard rule with the caveat that due
regard be given to the advanced state of the profession, suggesting that physicians must
keep reasonably abreast of developments. Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 282 A.2d 206
(1971); Darling v. Charleston Comm'y Mem. Hosp., 33 111. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965);
Hernandez v. Clinical Pasteur, Inc., 293 So. 2d 747, 749 (Fla. App. 1974); cf. Lundahl v.
Rockford Mem. Hosp. Ass'n, 93 Ill. App. 2d 461, 465, 235 N.E.2d 671, 674 (1968); Favalora
v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 144 So. 2d 544, 550-52 (La. App. 1962) (expert testimony estab-
lished standard practice, but also that profession recognized such practice as negligent;
therefore, custom held not a defense). Helling v. Carey ignored unanimous testimony
establishing the standard of care of ophthalmologists, to which the defendant physicians
had conformed. The decision suggests that medical malpractice may be turning to straight
negligence theory without the custom defense perturbation. Helling v. Carey, 83 Wash.
2d 514, 591 P.2d 981 (1974), citing Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Behymer, 189 U.S. 468, 470 (1903)
(Holmes, J.) (custom is evidence of the standard of care but not determinative) and The
T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932) (L. Hand, J.) ("a whole calling may have
unduly lagged in the adoption of new and available devices").
One commentator has termed Helling an "audacious pronouncement," adding that
"[t]he casualty insurance companies and defense counsel all around the country have
been stunned by this decision." Curran, Glaucoma and Streptococcal Pharyngitis: Diagnos-
tic Practices and Malpractice Liability, 291 NEw ENG. J. MEn. 508 (1974). See Stieglitz,
Liability of Accountants and Investment Counselors, 15 FOR THE DEFENSE 92 (1974) ("The
shock waves from the decision in Helling v. Carey [footnote omitted] have already begun
to spread and may be expected to permeate all areas of professional negligence litigation
in time"); cf. No-Fault Malpractice Insurance, 292 NEW ENG. J. MED. 163 (1975) (letters
regarding Curran, supra). Another approach to weakening the defense of customary
professional conduct is to broaden the class of experts allowed to testify to the standard.
See, e.g., Hiatt v. Groce, 523 P.2d 320 (Kan. 1974) (mother of 16 children allowed to testify
contrary to unanimous testimony of health care providers as to the applicable standard of
care for the delivery of infants).
45. See, e.g., Botta v. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82, 138 A.2d 713 (1958).
46. See Nixon, Changing Rules of Liability in Automobile Accident Litigation, 3 LAw
& CONTEMP. PROB. 476 (1936).
1149
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 84: 1141, 1975
result if health care providers complied with the standard of conduct
established by the jury determination.47
The custom defense, despite its drawbacks, may therefore be seen
as the closest approximation to the Learned Hand test we have avail-
able for some difficult cases. Experts-preferably doctors representing
the profession as a whole and not simply local practitioners48-would
in effect be weighing the Hand test's incommensurables in this highly
uncertain area, rather than lay jurors.49 The danger of enshrining neg-
ligent practices, however, suggests the need to validate any customary
conduct defense by systematic cost-benefit analysis, if lawmakers decide
not to abandon the defense altogether.
III. Restructuring the Negligence Liability Framework
Departures from traditional approaches might provide greater as-
surance that the cost-benefit analysis (which a determination of neg-
ligence liability theoretically approximates) is carried out with rea-
sonable accuracy at low administrative cost. Lawmakers might opt
for strict liability,5° which would remove the necessity for a jury neg-
47. Jury bias in favor of plaintiffs would not necessarily adversely affect resource
allocation. Defendants might still weigh the costs and benefits, of risky actions and opt to
pay damages if the damages are still cheaper than accident avoidance. Misallocation would
occur, however, if defendants-in this case health care providers-viewed juries as actually
making the determination of what constitutes optimal accident avoidance. Providers
especially would rely on jury determinations if the health care defendants feared personal
liability for damages due to inadequate insurance, or if they feared the stigma of being
branded negligent.
48. See note 39 supra.
49. Courts could modify the custom defense by viewing customary conduct as evidence
of the proper standard of care, and not dispositive. See Helling v. Carey, 83 Wash. 2d
514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974). A rule which permits introduction of evidence on the advanced
state of the profession, in a sense making the custom defense rebuttable upon a showing
that practitioners are lagging behind in the acquisition of new knowledge, might be
another possible intermediate step. This rule would return the law to its status in earlier
cases like Hansen v. Pock, 57 Mont. 51, 58-59, 187 P. 282, 284 (1920). See sources cited in
note 44 supra.
The pressure caused by negligence claims has prompted some tentative steps toward
self-regulation and systematic study within the profession. The Connecticut State Medical
Society and Aetna Life & Casualty have established four claims review panels in Con-
necticut. The panels, convened by legal counsel for the insurance company, represent a
cooperative effort between the sued physician, his peers, and the insurer and its lawyers.The patient's counsel is not present when the panel hears a claim. The participants hope
to develop case histories out of. the program to use as examples in a continuing educa-
tional program among physicians to hold down the amount of malpractice. 
Interview
with Leonard Tomat, Connecticut State Medical Society (CSMS), in New Haven, Conn.,
Jan. 16. 1975 (notes on file with the Yale Law Journal). "The claims review panels have
proven to be a most worthwhile educational experience and have involved more than 100
physicians in case evaluations which have in torn resulted in more equitable, and moreprompt settlements. It is Aetna's opinion that without these claims review panels the
rate increase in Connecticut might well have been higher." Letter from M. David Deren,
supra note 6.
50. Some physicians have expressed interest in "no-fault" liability. See, e.g., Rosen-
berg, No-Fault Malpractice Insurance, 292 NEw ENG. J. MED. 163 (1975); N.Y. Times, Jan.
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ligence verdict. Alternatively, lawmakers might select a system of col-
lective deterrence,al in which some centralized decisionmaker either
advises the jury as to what conduct results in benefits greater than
costs, or decides the outcome without a jury. Finally, lawmakers could
adopt an eclectic system involving elements of traditional negligence,
strict liability and collective deterrence.
A. Strict Liability as an Alternative
A strict liability system would impose liability on health care pro-
viders, without regard to negligence, for maloccurrences which are re-
lated to medical intervention or nonintervention. Little work has been
done toward formulating a general theory of strict liability.52 A notable
exception is the test for strict liability proposed by Professors Calabresi
and Hirschoff.53 They have argued that the Hand negligence test is
falling into disfavor, because it is interventionistic, calling for an organ
of the state to decide if an action is worthwhile;54 because it is ad-
ministratively expensive;5 and because it is a clumsy way to deter
in a world where risks are commonly insured."0 That is, fault is deter-
mined as between the immediate parties to the particular maloccur-
rence, but costs are often not borne at that level.57
As an alternative, Calabresi and Hirschoff propose that strict lia-
bility for accidents be imposed on whichever "of the parties to the
accident is in the best possible position to make the cost-benefit anal-
ysis between accident costs and accident avoidance costs and to act on
that decision once it is made."' 5 According to its originators, this test
13, 1975, at 33, col. 2. However, physicians probably do not mean strict liability--"literal
no-fault"-when they refer to no-fault liability. Rather, physicians refer to a workmen's
compensation-type system, or some form of liability which does not label the physician as
negligent. G. Parrella, Medical Malpractice Insurance (remarks to the Conn. Med. Soc'v
House of Delegates, Nov. 20, 1974; copy on file with the Yale Law Journal).
51. Collective, or specific, deterrence refers to collective decisionmaking regarding how
much of an activity to permit and how an activity should be performed. For a discussion
of this approach, see G. CAt,REsx, supra note 16, at 95-129.
52. Kalven, Tort Law-Tort Watch, 34 Am. TRIAL LAW. J. 1, 31 (1972).
53. Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 32. The authors of the test have never discussed
application of strict liability to medical maloccurrences.
54. See id. at 1074. For a discussion of a "reverse Learned Hand test," which would
put the burden of all accidents not worth avoiding on the injurer rather than on the
victim, see id. at 1059. Professor Calabresi gives a more detailed account of the reverse
Hand test in Calabresi, supra note 15, at 664-66.
55. See Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 32, at 1075-76.
56. See id. at 1069-70. Professor Calabresi has presented a concise assault on the fault
system in Calabresi, supra note 15, at 657-64.
57. See Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 32, at 1075.
58. Id. at 1060 (emphasis deleted).
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would be applied to broad categories, and not to individuals on a case-
by-case basis. It would not entail government intervention to deter-
mine which party is at fault.59 Implicit in the test is the notion that
strict liability should replace fault wherever a marked differential in
ability to perform the cost-benefit analysis relevant to the maloccur-
rence is evident between identifiable categories of parties.
The Calabresi-Hirschoff strict liability test and the Hand negligence
test differ in three important ways. First, the Calabresi-Hirschoff test
emphasizes that some individuals have more information than others,
and it gives explicit recognition to transaction costs. These concerns
are at best only implicit in the Hand test. Second, the Calabresi-Hir-
schoff strict liability test places liability for a maloccurrence on the
cheapest cost avoider even when the maloccurrence is not worth avoid-
ing. In contrast, the Hand negligence test would place liability for
accidents not worth avoiding on the victim. 60 Third, the strict lia-
bility test simply asks who is the best decisionmaker, not what decision
should be made-the question asked in a determination of fault under
a negligence system.
A superficial application of the test to the medical maloccurrence
field suggests that the physicians should be strictly liable. Presumably
health care providers, as a category, have more information or better
access to information than their patients and are therefore in a better
position to perform the cost-benefit analysis as to what procedures to
follow in diagnosing and treating ailments. Moreover, strict liability
seems to promise a savings in administrative costs comparable to that
expected under no-fault automobile insurance plans or under strict
products liability.61 There are several reasons, however, for lawmakers
to doubt the efficacy of strict liability when applied to medical mal-
occurrences.
59. Intervention would still be required to ascertain which category represents the
party best able to make the cost-benefit analysis and carry it out, but this is significantly
less government involvement than in the negligence test, in which a "government agency"
(the jury) actually does the cost-benefit analysis.
60. Professor Posner, opposed to strict liability in general, has argued that the Cala-
bresi-Hirschoff test simply requires a determination of which party is in a better position
to minimize the costs in a risky interaction, which is basically the same analysis required
by negligence theory. Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 205, 213-15
(1973). Professor Calabresi has given a partial response. See Calabresi, supra note 15, at
666-67.
61. Compare Bombaugh, The Department of Transportation's Auto Insurance Study
and Auto Accident Compensation Reform, 71 COLUas. L. REv. 207, 229-31 (1971) (collects
data on administrative costs of negligence system) with Comment, supra note 10, at 444-46.
Personal liability insurance premiums have decreased more than expected under New
York's no-fault auto insurance system. N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1975, at 1, col. 2.
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1. Defining Compensable Events
The key difficulty lies in defining compensable events,02 a problem
analogous to, but far more knotty than, defining "defect" in products
liability cases.03 Many patients will suffer permanent impairment-
or death-despite the physician's best efforts. To make the physician
responsible for maloccurrences, regardless of whether they were iatro-
genic (therapy-induced), would convert the physician into a general
health insurer for all his potential patients, except perhaps those
stricken so suddenly that they die before reaching the doctor's office.
Plainly strict liability must be limited to iatrogenic maloccurrences,
but isolating those events from all maloccurrences will be difficult,
easily controverted, and probably much litigated. For this reason, ad-
ministrative costs may remain nearly as high as they are under a
fault system.0 4
For example, suppose alternative treatments for a patient's ailment
are available. If the patient can prove at trial that he would be better
off had he been given the other treatment, then strict liability treats
the differential in well-being as iatrogenic and compensable. Or sup-
pose a patient has surgery on an arm mangled in an auto accident.
The blood supply to the arm is deficient and gangrene develops. The
court or jury must then determine whether the surgery or the auto
accident caused the gangrene. Finally, assume a situation like Helling
v. Carey where an impairment can be traced to failure to use a certain
diagnostic test. The physician had control, in that instance, of the
selection of the test, and was in the best position to make the analysis
of costs and benefits involved in using the test for patients under 40.
Under the Calabresi-Hirschoff test, the physician should be held liable.
But suppose the physician could detect and then prevent a malady only
by giving a recently discovered $10,000 test, available only at one
distant hospital. Should he still be liable, even if the malady only
"costs" the patient $100? At what point does the difficulty of diagnosis
become so great that the physician no longer is the cause, for purposes
of strict liability, of the ailment?
The problem can be overcome, to some extent, by adopting a much
62. This difficulty has been recognized. See, e.g., O'Connell, Expanding No-Fault
Beyond Auto Insurance: Some Proposals, 59 VA. L. REv. 749, 790-93 (1973), citing Keeton,
Compensation for Medical Accidents, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 590, 614-15 (1973). But cf. Com-
ment, supra note 10, at 424-30.
63. See generally Fischer, Products Liability-The Meaning of Defect, 39 Mo. L. REv.
339 (1974), discussing RESrATEMENT OF TORTS 2D § 402A; Comment, Products Liability: Is
§ 402A Strict Liability Really Strict in Kentucky?, 62 KY. L.J. 866 (1974).
64. See Posner, supra note 60, at 209.
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less ambitious strict liability system. The application of strict liability
might extend only to certain narrowly defined events which are clearly
iatrogenic, a limitation which could achieve some reductions in ad-
ministrative costs. 65 The remaining maloccurrences resulting in claims
against physicians, however, would continue to be handled under the
traditional negligence framework.
2. Malpractice Insurers and Administrative Costs
Malpractice insurers and lawyers play an important and remunera-
tive6" role in the present negligence system. The difficulties in de-
termining iatrogenicity under strict liability may sustain administra-
tive expenses caused by these parties at a level comparable to that
now plaguing the malpractice liability system.
Currently, malpractice claims against a physician are paid, in most
cases, by the physician's malpractice insurance carrier. There is some
discrimination in the premiums between high and low risk special-
ities, 67 and physicians against whom malpractice claims are asserted
can experience difficulty in obtaining insurance for as low a premium
as other physicians, 68 but the insurance does accomplish risk spreading.
Malpractice insurance, however, is quite expensive. Insurance com-
panies must set aside large reserves to meet claims because of the
special nature of medical litigation. Computation of premiums by
actuaries is complicated by the fact that many claims are not filed until
several years after the policy year, and may not be settled until several
years after they are filed-the "long-tail problem."0 9 Reserves must
be accumulated during the policy year to meet these future contin-
gencies, a task complicated by inflation.70 The insurance company
65. Professor Havighurst and Dr. Tancredi have devised such an approach. Havighurst
& Tancredi, supra note 10.
66. One estimate states that 15 percent of the malpractice dollar goes to the patient's
attorney and 55 percent to the defense attorney and for investigation expenses. Comment,
supra note 10, at 426. The malpractice insurer for New York has estimated that 60 cents
of the premium dollar go to the injured patient and his attorney. Letter from George A.
Wright, Jr., Ass't Indemnity Rep., H. F. Wanvig, Inc., to Charles H. Montange, Feb. 5,
1975 (on file with the Yale Law Journal).
67. See Suing the Doctor, supra note 6, at 78.
68. The experience of California physicians with such problems is presented in Medical
Malpractice and the Insurance Industry (Comm. Staff of Cal. Assembly Select Comm. on
Med. Malpractice, Memo, Mar. 13, 1974) [hereinafter cited as California Insurance]. For a
general discussion, see Kendall & Haldi, The Medical Malpractice Insurance Market, in
APPENDIX TO REPORT, supra note 10, at 494.
69. California Insurance, supra note 68, at 7-8. See Bird, Malpractice Insurance: A
Crisis in Health Care, N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1975, at I, col. 2.
70. The current recession, which has caused the value of insurance reserves to decline,
has also made liability insurance less attractive to insurers, see Wall St. J., Jan. 20, 1975,
at 1, col. 6, including insurers of physicians for malpractice, see Telephone Interview,
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also charges more because of additional risks due to the small size
of the malpractice insurance market,71 the "big claim," 72 and the
difficulty in predicting the trend in the frequency of claims. 73 Ap-
proximately 25 percent of a physician's malpractice insurance pre-
mium consequently is consumed by the maloccurrence insurer.7' An
additional estimated 50 percent of the premium is consumed by lawyers
in the form of fees for services in medical litigation.7 5
The administrative expense of malpractice insurance and litigation
is thus very high under the present negligence system. But if the
expense were to remain significant after the implementation of strict
liability, then one of the major advantages claimed for strict liability
systems generally76 would not materialize in the medical care field.
The uncertainty of medical care in fact makes continued high ex-
penses likely. There would no longer be litigation over the standard
of care, but there is significant potential for litigation over the issue
of iatrogenicity. Consequently, lawyers' fees under strict liability may
still take a large piece of any plaintiff's pie. Physicians, furthermore,
must insure against additional risks under strict liability-namely,
the risks of maloccurrences which are not worth avoiding. Added un-
certainty over the extent of these risks will probably cause insurance
companies to continue to amass large reserves-keeping premiums
high.77
supra note 5. Arbitration of medical malpractice claims has been suggested as a possible
cheaper alternative to present litigation, since arbitration would promote prompt settle-
ments, thus minimizing the need for large reserves due to inflation and future uncer-
tainties. Also, arbitration supposedly would result in lower fees. Interview with Leonard
Tomat, supra note 49. See PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 2, at 57; cf. N.Y. Times, Jan.
13, 1974, at 33, col. 2; G. Parrella, supra note 50. Senators Kennedy and Inouye have
proposed a bill establishing a national system of arbitration for medical malpractice
claims. S. 482, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), discussed in 121 CONG. RFc. S1142 (daily ed.
Jan. 29, 1975).
71. California Insurance, supra note 68, at 7.
72. A very small proportion of all claims filed will result in disproportionately large
recoveries. Since the small number of "big claims" is unpredictable, actuaries have dif-
ficulty calculating coverage formulae. Id.
73. A large increase in frequency of claims occurred in the late 1940's and early 1950's.
After a plateau, the frequency has risen dramatically since the early 1960's. Consequently
the frequency factor is difficult for an actuary to estimate. Id. at 8.
74. See, e.g., G. Parrella, supra note 50, at 2.
75. See, e.g., id. Estimates, of course, vary widely. See Comment, supra note 10, at 426
(70 percent to lawyers and investigation fees), 445 (patient receives 16 to 27 percent of
total malpractice premium); PRELAINARY REPORT, supra note 2, at 5-6 (16 to 25 percent
of insurance premium goes to patient).
76. See note 61 supra; G. CALABR.Si, supra note 16, at 250-55.
77. Telephone Interview with D. John Pecorino, Manager in Marketing Dept., profes-
sional liability specialist, Aetna Life & Casualty Co., Hartford, Conn., Jan. 17, 1975 (notes
on file with the Yale Law Journal). Pecorino termed the costs of strict liability "almost
impossible" to determine. He suggested that the cost for such coverage would increase.
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3. Determination of the Final Cost Bearer
If physicians are able to pass the costs of liability (which includes
insurance premiums) to patients, the ultimate risk bearers will be
the patients even though initial liability is placed upon the physician.
There is evidence that part of the cost of liability is now borne by
patients,"" although it is unlikely that physicians have sufficient un-
exercised market power to pass on all the cost of liability. This prob-
lem complicates incentives to avoid risks that the current fault system
or a proposed strict liability system would supposedly provide. Impo-
sition of strict liability upon physicians who can pass on the costs will
produce no economic incentives for physicians to change their conduct.
Physicians could more likely pass costs of maloccurrences to patients
if patients were receiving health care subsidies from the government,
or met medical expenses through health insurance.79 The switch to
strict liability might then only serve to increase costs to patients.80
This is particularly true if high administrative expenses are passed to
patients.
4. Incentives for Research
Strict liability is often imposed even in situations involving un-
avoidable risks because the law assumes that such additional liability
will cause the liable party to engage in research to discover new
methods to avoid the risk."' Thus, unavoidability in and of itself is
not grounds for opposing strict liability. But if decisionmakers impose
no-fault liability in order to encourage research, such liability should
be imposed upon a group which can organize to produce and dis-
tribute research.
It is unlikely that practicing physicians can organize an efficient
78. "When a California patient visits a doctor's office now, for instance, it is estimated
that as much as $1.50 of the amount charged for the visit goes to cover the doctor's mal-
practice insurance premiums." PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 2, at 49; see HEW
SEc'Y's REPORT, supra note 9, at 13.
79. See Arrow, supra note 15, at 961-64; Pauly, The Economics of Moral Hazard:
Comment, 58 Am. ECON. REv. 531 (1968); Arrow, The Economics of Moral Hazard: Further
Comment, 58 id. 537.
80. The increase in costs to the patient entails a second problem. The patient might
then fail to purchase health care when he should, thus increasing the number, and cost,
of maloccurrences overall.
An interesting redistributional effect resulting from strict liability is an income transfer
from poor victims to rich victims. This occurs if providers can raise prices to cover ac-
cident costs. In such a case, part of the price for medical care paid by a poor patient
would be directed to compensating rich patients, whose losses from any given maloccur-
rence might be greater than those of the poor patient. See Oi, The Economics of Product
Safety, 4 BELL J. EcoN. & MAN. Sci. 3 (1973); Oi, The Economics of Product Safety: A
Rejoinder, 5 id. 689, 690 (1974).
81. See Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 32, at 1071.
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market for research innovations useful to themselves as practitioners.8 2
The National Academy of Sciences has stated that "defects of the mar-
ket mechanism with respect to the allocation of resources toward and
among investments in research imply that the market needs to be
supplemented, and perhaps, with respect to basic scientific research,
entirely replaced by social provision and allocation of resources for
the support of scientific research."8 13 Imposition of strict liability is
not likely to change these basic market characteristics. Government
intervention probably would remain necessary in order to obtain a
socially optimal allocation of resources to the acquisition of new
knowledge.
5. Strict Liability: A Reappraisal
Calabresi-Hirschoff strict liability attempts to increase the likeli-
hood that optimal allocation choices will be made in risky situations
by placing liability on the group best equipped to make the choice
and carry it out. This approach relies upon private decisionmakers
encouraged by market incentives. However, the special nature of
medical care complicates the usual analysis of strict liability. Provider
uncertainty, the inherent riskiness of medical care, and the difficulty
in organizing a market for information and research make it unlikely
that strict liability is a panacea for problems generated by medical
litigation, especially if such a system is implemented unsystematically
through the state courts.84
Two central problems at a practical level may be isolated: the un-
likelihood of a marked reduction in the very high administrative
costs, and the need to ensure that information is generated and shared
in an efficient fashion. If strict liability is to be implemented, special
attention must be given to these factors.
82. The inadequate devotion of resources to research is a result of external economics
which cause a divergence between the private and social benefits of research. Since the
private benefits are less, the market underinvests in basic research. E. MANSFIELD, MICRO-
ECONOMICS 430 (1970); Arrow, supra note 15, at 946 n.8; Hearings on Health, Education,
and Welfare Regulations for Health Services, 1973, Appendix-Comprehensive HEW
Simplification and Reform--"MEGA Proposal" Before the Subcomm. on Health of the
Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 284-85 (1973).
83. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, BASIC RESEARCH AND NATIONAL GOALS, REPORT TO
THE COMMITE ON SCIENCE AND ASTRONAUTICS OF THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REP-
RESENTATIVES 136 (1965), quoted in E. MANSFIELD, supra note 82, at 430. It has been argued
elsewhere that only governmental intervention can achieve the optimal amount of re-
search. See, e.g., Daddario, Science Policy: Relationships Are the Key, DAEDALUS, Summer
1974, at 135.
84. If a least cost avoider does not exist for many of the maloccurrences in the
medical care market, liability may be attributed on grounds other than efficient alloca-
tion of resources. Thus, lawmakers may still propose strict liability, or some other type
of liability, for distributional or other reasons.
1157
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 84: 1141, 1975
6. The Inouye-Kennedy No-Fault Proposal: S. 215
On January 17, 1975, Senators Inouye and Kennedy proposed a bill,
S. 215,85 to enact optional strict liability for medical maloccurrences.
S. 215 demonstrates the possibility of devising a strict liability system
which may reduce administrative costs relative to compensation paid
to patients, and gather information in useful forms.
The bill proposes a federal no-fault medical maloccurrence insurance
fund"0 supported entirely by premiums charged to health care pro-
viders87 who elect to participate.8 8 S. 215 also would provide federal
malpractice insurance for traditional tort lawsuits.8 9 Patients of pro-
viders who participate in the fund may bring a claim against their
provider in either the federal no-fault system (with claims presented
initially to the Secretary of HEW) or in the traditional state negli-
gence systems, but not both.90
The bill provides for no-fault 9 ' compensation 92 for "loss from any
injury suffered as a result of health care services provided by an in-
sured to [any] beneficiary ... - 3 An injury "means physical harm,
bodily impairment, disfigurement, or delay in recovery."9 4 "[A]n in-
85. S. 215, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); see 121 CONG. REc. S413-21 (daily ed. Jan. 17,
1975). In addition Senator Nelson has introduced S. 188, a bill to authorize the Secretary
of HEW to establish a medical malpractice reinsurance program, and to conduct ex-
periments and studies on medical malpractice. 121 CONG. REc. S292 (daily ed. Jan. 16,
1975). See also H.R. 1378, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
86. S. 215, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1702(a) (1975).
87. Id. § 1703. The bill is not clear as to whether the fund is to develop a reserve to
meet claims in the future arising out of mishaps in a given year, thus acting as a true
insurer, or is simply to spread the cost of all settled claims among providers in the year
the claims were settled regardless of the year in which they originated.
88. 121 CONG. REC. S414, col. 2 (daily ed. Jan. 17, 1975) (remarks of Senator Inouye).
Providers, in order to participate in the no-fault system, must submit to national licensing
requirements (compare S. 215, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1704(a) (1975) with id. § 1731) and
certain review procedures. Id. §§ 1704(b), (c). If an undue number of claims are filed
against a provider, an investigation shall be ordered. Id. § 1707(b). Federal coverage can
be terminated if the provider is found to give patients harmful or inadequate services.
Id. & 1706(b)(4). This latter provision may punish patients more than the deficient
provider and seems mainly designed to protect the insurance fund against claims. A
better approach would entail disciplinary action against the provider rather than taking
insurance protection from the patients.
89. S. 215, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1708 (1975).
90. Id. § 1717. Claims under the federal no-fault system would be presented to the
Secretary of HEW. Id. § 1715(a). Within 60 days of the filing of a claim, the Secretary
must make findings of fact and a decision of the claimant's rights. The claimant is en-
titled to a hearing if he so requests. The Secretary may affirm, modify, or reverse his
findings or decision based on evidence adduced at the hearing. Id. The Secretary's
decision may be appealed to the federal district courts. Id. §§ 1715(a)(2), (d). Decisions of
the district courts are to be reviewable as any other civil action. Id. § 1715(d).
91. See id. §§ 1701(c)(2), 1711, 1714, 1721(10).
92. Compensation is limited to no more than $2,000 per month counting other sources
of continuing income for economic loss, and $2,000 per month for noneconomic loss in-
cluding pain and suffering. Id. § 1713(a). No-fault benefits are payable monthly as loss
accrues. Id. § 1714(b).
93. Id. § 1711(a).
94. Id. § 1721(7).
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jury 'results' from the provision of health care services when it is more
probably associated in whole or in part with the provision of such
services than with the condition for which such services were pro-
vided." 95 "Health care services" include "the rendering, as well as the
omission, of any care, treatment, or services . . .,,"
The broad definition of compensable events will likely result in
considerable litigation over iatrogenicity, but the bill does have other
provisions which offer some hope of reduced litigation costs. S. 215
abolishes contingency fees for attorneys for work in the no-fault sys-
tem.97 Attorney's compensation is limited to "reasonable" fees for
services rendered, 98 whether or not the patient is successful with his
no-fault claim. The proportion of damages going to patients, relative
to the no-fault insurance premium, may therefore be expected to be
larger than under the present system. The bill presumably would
result in administrative savings if special hearing officers developed
expertise in ascertaining when maloccurrences are iatrogenic.99
S. 215 provides a good framework for the compilation of informa-
tion regarding maloccurrences, 10 0 an invaluable basis on which to
95. Id. § 1721(8). A problem develops if the maloccurrence is compensable if it is only
"in part" therapy-induced. If this means that federal no-fault will compensate for the
entire illness because the patient suffers an iatrogenic maloccurrence aggravating the
illness, then the health care provider is moved toward the position of general health
insurer. Congress, in that case, could properly consider requiring provider premiums to
meet only the portion of the expense of the fund allocable to iatrogenic disorders. The
remainder could be paid directly through national health insurance or some other source.
96. Id. § 1721(11).
97. Id. § 1726(a). This provision might give rise to some abuses, since the no-fault
system is optional. Attorneys anxious for large contingency fees might encourage tradi-
tional negligence lawsuits in the state courts for cases in which the negligence is clear
and damages large, but bring claims of lesser value or claims in which the provider was
not at fault under the Inouye-Kennedy proposal. Thought might therefore be given to
restricting use of the contingency fee malpractice cases brought in state courts so the
federal no-fault plan is not disadvantaged. A second problem develops if the Secretary
adopts restrictive procedures, provides insufficient compensation to patients, or insuf-
ficiently compensates attorneys who represent patients, in order to hold down the costs
of the Inouye-Kennedy proposal. If the Secretary fails to compensate at least as adequately
as the negligence system, attorneys may consistently advise their clients to seek tradi-
tional tort remedies, at least in "surer" cases.
98. Id.
99. Some elements of potential negligence litigation remain, even under the Inouye-
Kennedy no-fault proposal. A provider must inform his patient of a possible no-fault
claim within 30 days after the provider knew or "reasonably should have known" of the
claim's feasibility. Id. § 1705(c)(2). If the provider fails to inform, he is personally liable.
Id. Given the difficulty in defining the scope of compensable events, it is conceivable
that there could be considerable controversy over what the physician or hospital reason-
ably should have known. Consequently, there may be a number of providers personally
liable in the no-fault system. This possibility may deter providers from participating in
the system. The bill is commendable in seeking to pressure providers, the parties with
the best access to the information concerning iatrogenicity, to disclose facts even though
the disclosure is contrary to the provider's interests. The proposal may go, however, too
far. Perhaps it should be amended to place some limits on providers' liability for failure
to disclose.
100. The Secretary must report all claims to relevant state personnel. Id. § 1707(a)(1).
In case of an unusually high number of claims, the Secretary shall investigate the provider
involved. Id. § 1707(b).
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evaluate the costs and benefits of various treatments, and to evaluate
possibly deficient providers. Areas requiring research could more read-
ily be identified. A strict liability system implemented through the
state courts would not provide this important information in such an
efficient framework. Certainly the present negligence system does not.
Enactment of some form of S. 215 would provide a useful test of
the feasibility of strict liability in the medical care market. Optional
no-fault might provide a useful adjunct to an arsenal of measures
aimed at achieving optimal medical care at minimal expense. An al-
ternative approach in the arsenal involves explicit choices by collec-
tive decisionmakers to prohibit certain activities.
B. Collective Deterrence
1. Collective Prohibitions as a Means of Providing Information
Liability rules may be treated as part of an information processing
system. 10 For example, Calabresi-Hirschoff strict liability may be
viewed as consumer delegation of part of the information processing
task to the producer (assuming the latter is the least cost avoider) as
an agent. But in the medical-care market, the producer-the physician-
is not necessarily generally possessed of efficient means of acquiring all
the relevant knowledge to act as an optimal information processing sys-
tem. 0 2 The best such system in the medical-care industry might in-
clude explicit prohibitions on certain risky activities. 10 3 For example,
prohibition of the use of thalidomide is seen, in a sense, as the cheapest
way to inform physicians and patients of the drug's dangerous proper-
ties.10 4 However, reliance solely on prohibitions of certain procedures
would either reach only the grossest instances of inappropriate prac-
tices, or would prevent individualized treatment desirable to reflect
special circumstances presented by the complexities of particular cases.
Thus, a scheme of general rules should be flexible enough to recognize
appropriate exceptions.
101. Goldberg, The Economics of Product Safety and Imperfect Information, 5 BELL J.
ECoN. & MAN. Sc. 683, 685 (1974).
102. See Murnaghan, supra note 18, at 605. One means of improving the functioning
of health care providers is the use of patient-care protocols. Grimm, Shimoni, Harlan &
Estes, Evaluation of Patient-Care Protocol Use by Various Providers, 292 NEw ENG. J.
MEn. 507 (1975).
103. See Goldberg, supra note 101.
104. Cf. G. CA.ABsI, supra note 16, at 103-07.
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2. The PSRO Amendment: A Missed Opportunity
Enacted in 1972, the Professional Standards Review Organization
(PSRO) Amendment'0 5 to the Medicare and Medicaid provisions of
the Social Security Act represents a variation on the collective deter-
rence model. The PSRO Amendment was passed primarily to limit
the costs of federal health care programs by eliminating unnecessary
provision of medical services.10 It requires the establishment, in co-
operation with the medical profession, 07 of Professional Standards
Review Organizations in regions throughout the country, to set stand-
ards for medical services provided to Medicare and Medicaid patients.
Congress repeatedly asserted that these criteria should be based on
customary standards' 0 as established by local physicians. 10 9
Providers are given three incentives to abide by the standards set
by a PSRO. A PSRO may recommend that a noncomplying physician
be suspended from eligibility for program reimbursements for Medi-
care or Medicaid medical services."10 Alternatively, the practitioner
may be required to pay back to the government up to $5000 for dis-
approved services."' The critical feature of the PSRO Amendment,
105. 42 U.S.C. § 1320-c (Supp. II, 1972). For a good discussion, see Note, Federally
Imposed Self-Regulation of Medical Practice: A Critique of the Professional Standards
Review Organization, 42 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 822 (1974). See generally Comment, PSRO:
Malpractice Liability and the Impact of the Civil Immunity Clause, 62 GEo. L.J. 1499
(1974).
106. See Note, supra note 105, at 825. The problem of rendition of unnecessary treat-
ment still continues. Cerra, Program Here Finds 28% of Surgery Unnecessary, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 15, 1974, at 1, col. 6; McCarthy & Widmer, Effects of Screening by Consultants on
Recommended Elective Surgical Procedures, 291 NEw ENC. J. MED. 1331 (1974); cf. Bloom
& Peterson, Patient Needs and Medical-Care Planning, 290 id. 1171 ($3 million annually
could be saved through economies of scale and better admission criteria in coronary care
units in Massachusetts); Hearings on Health Care Crisis in America, 1971, Before the Sub-
comm. on Health of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.,
pt. 3, at 394-95 (1971).
This concern has manifested itself in efforts to control expenditures for hospitals as
well. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1974, at 27, col. 4; 32 CONC. Q.W. REP. 3222-23 (1974), dis-
cussing National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-641, 88 Stat. 2225 (to revise and extend federal health planning programs).
107. The American Medical Association faced a near revolt of its constituents in
agreeing to cooperate in implementation of the PSRO legislation. After ferocious op-
position, see, e.g., Spivak, "Heal Thyself..." Medical-Care Review Stirs a Fiery Debate
Among U.S. Doctors, Wall St. J., June 24, 1974, at 1, col. 1, the A.M.A. decided to co-
operate with the federal government. See Kramer, AMA Eases Opposition to Plan to
Monitor Care of Medicaid and Medicare Patients, Wall St. J., June 27, 1974, at 8, col. 1.
The American Medical Association has filed suit to block the hospital utilization review
aspects of the PSRO Amendment. Delaney, A.M.A. Suing U.S. over Peer Review, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 21, 1975, at 1, col. 8.
108. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320c-4(a)(l)(B), -5(a), -9(a)(l)(B) 9- (D), -9(a)(2)(A) (Supp.
II, 1972).
109. Surprisingly, the Amendment seems to require that the standards be set and
monitored by local experts, contrary to the developments in state litigation which are
toward national standards or even away from customary conduct as an absolute defense
at all. See p. 1163 infra. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320c-4(b)(l), (d)(1) (Supp. II, 1972).
110. Id. § 1320c-9(b)(1).
111. Id. § 1320c-9(b)(3).
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however, is a purported grant of malpractice immunity to a physician
or other provider for "any action taken by him in compliance with
or reliance upon professionally developed norms of care and treatment
applied by a [PSRO] . . . ." The immunity applies if the physician
or provider "exercised due care in . . . actions taken in compliance
[with PSRO standards]." 1 2 This provision could be interpreted as a
flat grant of immunity if PSRO standards are followed, or as a re-
buttable presumption that a physician acted nonnegligently if he abid-
ed by the standards 113 If the PSRO Amendment is interpreted as an
immunity provision, the federal government will in effect have legis-
lated a mandatory custom defense. Caspar Weinberger, Secretary of
HEW, apparently supports the absolute immunity interpretation: "I
would like to see states adopt the rule that physicians and others who
adhere to standards of care adopted by local PSRO's will be able to
assert this as a real defense to a malpractice suit, and thus reduce
materially the cost of unnecessary defensive medical practice." 114 The
Medical Society of the State of New York is apparently advocating
such an approach." 5 But there is nothing in the present PSRO law
which will prompt PSRO's to adopt "necessary" and reject "unneces-
sary" treatments-the law simply fails to indicate what optimal treat-
ment is other than customary practice." 6
Congress should have required that a PSRO be guided in setting
its standards by whether a particular treatment results in benefits in
excess of costs; PSRO's could then have served to alleviate provider
uncertainty. 1 7 However, there is no mechanism encouraging, or even
112. Id. § 1320c-16(c).
113. Note, supra note 105, at 838-39.
114. Malpractice Crisis Warned, Am. Med. News, Jan. 6, 1975, at 9, col. 4.
115. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1975, at 33, col. 1.
116. Further, experience with self-regulation by health care providers suggests the
conclusion that some alternative means of policing medical decisionmaking is necessary
in order to assure that minimal standards are established. See, e.g., PRELIMINARY REPORT,
supra note 2, at 50-56; Gentry v. Department of Professional & Occup. Regs., 293 So. 2d
95, 97 (Fla. App. 1974) (professional licensing board prohibited from suspending practi-
tioner's license for mere negligence); Hearings, supra note 106, pt. 2, at 227-28. General
standards should not protect a provider who fails to tailor his services to an individual
patient with an unusual medical problem. See Note, supra note 105, at 841-42.
The defective PSRO Amendment is important in light of calls for the establishment of
some variety of national health insurance. See Lyons, A Health-Care Bill? Prognosis is
Maybe, N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1975, § 5, at 5, col. 1. It is possible that a national health
insurance plan might incorporate organizations with powers modeled after those estab-
lished by the PSRO Amendment. S. 215 also refers to compliance with PSRO Amendment
requirements. See S. 215, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 1704(a), (c)(l).
117. See Anderson, PSRO as Educational Process, 290 NEv ENG. J. MAIE. 1322-23 (1974);
Colcock, PSRO's, 290 id. 1318; Welch, supra note 7, at 1319; cf. Buck & White, Peer Re-
view: Impact of a System Based on Billing Claims, 291 id. 877.
Lawmakers could also improve the sharing of information by encouraging access of
patients to their medical records. See Shenkin & Warner, Giving the Patient His Medical
Record: A Proposal to Improve the System, 289 NEw ENG. J. MED. 688 (1973); A. Golodetz,
J. Ruess & R. Milhous, The Right to Know: Giving the Patient His Medical Record
(Paper presented to Nov. 1974 meeting of the Am. Cong. of Rehabilitation Med. and the
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enabling, the PSRO's to undertake this type of cost-benefit research."18
The emphasis is upon existing regional custom. The Amendment un-
wisely runs contrary to an incipient movement in the states, exempli-
fied in Helling v. Carey,"19 to cut back on the custom defense. Con-
g-ress missed an important opportunity, but the PSRO mandate could
yet be changed so that the organizations are induced to set standards
on the basis of systematic studies, 20 rather than simply enshrining
the local customary practice-whether or not that practice best serves
patients' interests.
Conclusion
Minimizing the costs of medical maloccurrences, the costs of mal-
occurrence avoidance, and administrative costs in medical litigation
presents difficulties due to the lack of information in the medical
care market. No liability system is without problems, but strict liability
is far from a panacea. A dramatic savings in administrative costs is less
likely to materialize with medical care strict liability than with strict
liability in other tort areas, because of the difficulties in determining
iatrogenicity. Nonetheless, legislatures might consider systems of strict
liability, either limited in scope or optional like S. 215, as supplements
to the present negligence framework. Important improvement could
also be achieved within the negligence framework: for example, courts
should continue to cut back on the custom defense where existing
medical practice is not providing optimal care to patients. Finally,
to the extent that lawmakers rely on collective deterrence, they should
avoid unthinking adoption of existing customary medical care. They
should instead enact standards derived from systematic cost-benefit
analysis.
Am. Acad. of Physical Med.); Rosenberg, Informed Consent-An Appraisal of Patients'
Reactions, Hose. MED. STAFF, July 1974, at 12; Cannell v. Medical & Surg. Clinics, S.C.,
315 N.E.2d 278 (Ill. App. 1974).
118. The National Professional Standards Review Council may make studies on which
to base recommendations. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-12(e)(4) (Supp. II, 1974). However, there is
no instruction to direct the studies toward areas of medicine in which practitioners would
benefit from research. For another critique of PSRO's, see Willett, PSRO Today: A
Lawyer's Assessment, 292 NEW ENG. J. MED. 340 (1975); Simmons, PSRO Today: The
Program's Viewpoint, 292 id. 365.
119. 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974); see note 44 supra.
120. Such studies are possible and have been done for some medical procedures. E.g.,
Mass. Dep't of Public Health, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Newborn Screening for Metabolic
Disorders, 291 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1414 (1974) (net savings if PKU test is given); McCarthy
9. Widmer, Effects of Screening by Consultants on Recommended Elective Surgical Pro-
cedures, 291 id. 1331 (net savings if screening utilized); Sagel, Evens, Forest & Bramson,
Efficacy of Routing Screening and Lateral Chest Radiographs in a Hospital-Based Popula-
tion, 291 id. 1001. Cf. Logerfo, Cost-Benefits in PSRO Law, 292 id. 53; Welch, Cost-Bene-
fits in PSRO Law, 292 id. 54; Katz, A Probability Graph Describing the Predictive Value
of a Highly Sensitive Diagnostic Test, 291 id. 1115; Bloom & Peterson, Patient Needs and
Medical-Care Planning, 290 id. 1171.
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